GDG- Gettysburg The second day

[Richard M Kadas]

Tom,
  What I know about the BMI comes primarily one source which is Edwin Fishell's The Secret War For The Union: The Untold Story of Military Intelligence In The Civil war'[, published 1996 by Houghton Mifflin company, ISBN =0-395-74281-1. In Chapter 23, the Thirtieth Of June Mr. Fishel writes about how all Union intelligence pulled together to give Meade an excellent situation appreciation as he concentrated at GB in response to reports of a meeting engagement between the AoP's leading elements and the Confederate forces main body. On pages 517-18 in particular he describes and analyzes the one Union intel failure where intel regarding the pinpointing of the ANV's concentration point as GB instead of Chambersburg. This intellligence appreciation was sent from Harrisburg by General Haupt at 12:45AM using intel gathered by the Union's railroad intelligence ring. This intel was also sent to the War Department which received it at 01:35 hours. It  was verified to have been sent
 to Frederick MD the location acting as Meade's commo center, but for a lack of courriers wasn't sent to Meade. I hope this fully answers your excellent question as to my information source
  Dick
Tom Ryan <pennmardel at mchsi.com> wrote:
  Esteemed GDG Member Contributes:


Dick,

Re your comment:

<start of the invasion using the'All Source' intelligence system set up by
Hooker and Sharpe. Its sole failure (one of communication not intel) was
when Meade was denied the very early morning July 1information (12:45AM)
which for some unknown reason wasn't ever communicated to him that Lee's
concentration point had shifted from Chambersberg to GB.>>

Could you elaborate on the point about the BMI failing to inform Meade
about the shift from Chambersburg to Gettysburg. Is there evidence in the
records of this?

<disadvantage being dependent on single source intel; and that he had no
dedicated staff to either assemble or analyze any data collected.>>

I would concur that Lee was heavily dependent on Stuart as his primary
information gatherer. There is some evidence that Charles Marshall and
Charles Venable of Lee's personal staff handled some intelligence matters,
but it does not appear that Lee had any dedicated intel staff. From what is
known, Lee was his own intelligence officer essentially like his idol George
Washington was in the Revolutionary War, and just as George McClellan was on
the Northern side earlier in the war.

That is why Lee's bare bones operation took such a hit when Stuart was not
available to respond to Lee's intel requirements. By using pre-Gettysburg
history as a guide, it stands out that Lee was successful in his operations
when he had a solid information basis to plan his strategy and tactics (the
Penninsula Campaign, Second Bull Run, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, and
even Antietam despite the Lost Order fiasco). Again with the exception of
Antietam (which McClellan basically squandered) Gettysburg was the first
time that Lee did not fight with a clear intelligence advantage, and he lost
the battle. I think there were several points in the campaign where the
availability of reliable information about Union movements could have turned
the tide of battle in Lee's favor.

On the Union side, contrast how well informed Meade was at Gettysburg with
what happened to Hooker at Chancellorsville. Hooker started out with a
clear advantage because of the information put together by his all source
intel operation, but blinded himself by sending the bulk of his cavalry on a
raid prior to the battle. Meade had all the tools he needed to make a good
fight at Gettysburg, while Lee at Gettysburg and Hooker at Chancellorsville
did not.

Regards, Tom








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