GDG- Gettysburg The second day

[Chet Diestel]

> Esteemed GDG Member James Cameron Contributes:
>
>
> << Pfanz also covers Lee's reorganization of the ANV. The Anv, with an 
> entirely new command Heirarchy, and the Aop with a new General commanding, 
> but, for all intents and purpose, the same structure. It would seem, and I 
> think that thats what Pfanz is saying in the last paragragh, that the only 
> "veteren" army on the field was the AoP , while the ANV with all it's 
> experience, was an untested organization.
>  K. >>
>
> An excellent point.
> Should this have called for any changes to Lee's accustomed style of 
> command?  If so, was he likely to have made any changes?
>
> Jim Cameron
>
And your point brings up one of the questions which has always nagged me 
about Lee's actions during the battle: Namely, why did is devote so much 
time keeping close to Longstreet and leaving both Hill and Ewell, neither 
who had ever commanded a corps in battle before, on their own, save for an 
aide or courier now and again.
  Yes, the argument can be made --- with justification --- that Longstreet 
was deliberate, perhaps in the extreme, in getting set up --- something Lee 
was well aware of --- but no one argues that once in battle Longstreet would 
push hard and do more with his troops than any other corps commander on 
either side.
  Lee's plan called for an attack in echelon along the whole line and there 
was no doubt that Longstreet could successfully carry out such a complicated 
maneuver. However, Hill and Ewell were another matter and indeed the plan 
feel apart when it got to Anderson's Division of Hill's Corps with only the 
brigades of Wilcox, Perry and Wright charging along with part of Posey's and 
then it just died. Lee should been up with Hill ordering him, in no 
uncertain terms, to get those people in motion and followed the attack as it 
flowed northward and around the fishhook. But he wasn't.
  I have no real satisfying answer, but this is certainly another prime 
example of the poor command and staff operations which plagued the ANV 
before, during and after Gettysburg versus the excellent C&S of the AOP 
which benefited it throughout the war.
  With regards,
      Chet