GDG- Gettysburg The second day

[keith mackenzie]

Meade had a much better idea of where the ANV was, including Stuarts cavalry, than Lee had of the whereabouts of the AoP. He seems to have been a tad more sensitive to any potential threat to Baltimore, which I suppose makes  more sense than knocking himself out trying to cover Philly and Washington, Washington being heavily fortified and Philly being kind of far away.
  K.

James Cameron <cameron2 at optonline.net> wrote:
  Esteemed GDG Member Contributes:


Chapter 1, From the Potomac to Pennsylvania, sets the stage, starting with 
Hooker being relieved from command and replaced by Meade.

Pfanz describes Meade as capable, aggressive, and prudent. He also 
describes the orders Meade was given, which made the AOP both the covering 
army for Washington, and, the army of operation against Lee.

What constraints did the dual nature of these orders place upon Meade? As 
sensitive as the Administration was to any potential threat to Washington, 
did Meade, as a practical matter, act much differently than he would have 
anyway, in how he was able to maneuver against Lee?

Jim Cameron


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