GDG- BMI

[Tom Ryan]

Tim,

	It all depends on where we, the long distance observers, believe the burden
should lie for recognizing and accepting the intelligence that the BMI
produced.  In my opinion, that burden belongs on the AoP commanders.  The
BMI gathered the information from various sources, analyzed the data, and
wrote reports for the commanding general -- Hooker first and then Meade.
The conduit for this information was Chief of Staff Butterfield, and,
following Gettysburg, Humphreys.  The reports themselves were intended for
Hooker and Meade, however.

	Unfortunately, we cannot get into the heads of these two commanders to
learn how much weight they gave to the BMI's reports.  Meade, of course, was
new to the job, but had been aware of the nature and purpose of the BMI
while he was still a corps commander.  Butterfield and PMG Patrick had been
there at the creation of the BMI, and both essentially took credit for
organizing and staffing the bureau.  The question then arises how much
credibility did Meade assign to Butterfield and Patrick as advisers.  Based
on what we know, it can be generally believed that both Butterfield and
Patrick had a high opinion of the BMI and considered their reports reliable.
Yet Meade did not place a lot of trust in Butterfield, but evidently had a
good opinion of Patrick.

	Col. Sharpe, the BMI leader, from all accounts was an impressive individual
who inspired respect and trust in those who worked with him.  Therefore,
Meade should have felt comfortable working with this man and relying on his
judgment regarding the facts about the enemy.  However, Meade proved over
time that he did not grasp the concept of an all-source intelligence
process, and eventually reverted to a method employed by both George
McClellan and Robert E. Lee, that is serving as his own chief of
intelligence.

	Another way to look at the intelligence picture at Gettysburg is what
choice did Meade have but to rely on the BMI?  Where else was detailed,
supported information to come from?  Frightened civilians along the roadside
counting passing troops seems to me not a good substitute for professionals
who have established themselves based on their work in the previous
campaign.  Again, the question is where does the burden lie in recognizing
what is the most reliable information available?  I think it has to be
placed on Meade and his commanders.

	A wise thing for Meade to have done would have been to have Sharpe brief
the AoP commanders at the beginning of their meetings on July 2, 4 and 12 in
order to give them the benefit of the latest intelligence.  This briefing
should have included an updated order of battle of the ANV showing brigades,
divisions and corps, the names of the Rebel commanders of each unit, and the
size of the force under their command.  That undoubtedly would have
stiffened some backbones in those meetings.  Fortified with this
information, the commanders may have been more willing to conduct offensive
action following Pickett's Charge and/or at Williamsport.

	Another aspect to consider is that Meade and his commanders had fought
Lee's army for three days in extremely close combat.  The burden once again
must fall on them to marry that experience with the BMI's data, and come up
with a clearer picture of how strong the enemy really is.  The fact that
they did not leaves the impression that the AoP commanders were cowed by Lee
and the ANV, readily accepting that they were larger than life.

	The AoP commanders continued to maintain this mindset during the retreat,
despite the fact that their advantage in men had reached some 30,000 (not
counting 25,000 secondary troops lurking nearby).  Although I would prefer
to assess this situation from a more positive perspective, the events as
they unfolded point in the opposite direction.

Regards, Tom




----Original Message-----
From: gettysburg-bounces at arthes.com
[mailto:gettysburg-bounces at arthes.com]On Behalf Of Tim Gennett
Sent: Tuesday, October 31, 2006 7:07 AM
To: GDG
Subject: Re: GDG- BMI


Esteemed GDG Member Contributes:


Tom, thanks for the follow up.

However, I am slow to criticize Meade for not putting more value in the BMI
data based on the info that I see.  The fact that Marsena Patrick believed
in the numbers is not compelling.  It was his outfit, you would expect him
to believe.  Were there other voices telling Meade the BMI data was good?
Meade was the head of a large organization, and had many voices to listen
to.  Patrick alone saying this was good data would not be very compelling.

I still don't have a sense of when it was generally accepted that the BMI
data was sound.  Your reference to the data on Ewell's corps does not make
this clear.  Sure, we know today that the numbers were accurate.  Is it
possible to pinpoint a time when the reliability of their data was generally
accepted?  I have the sense that if Meade had said to his corps commanders
that he was going to do such and so based on the reliability of the BMI data
that there would have been a lot of raised eyebrows in the group.

Regards, Tim

----- Original Message -----
From: "Tom Ryan" <pennmardel at mchsi.com>
To: "GDG" <gettysburg at arthes.com>
Sent: Monday, October 30, 2006 21:00
Subject: RE: GDG- BMI


> Esteemed GDG Member Contributes:
>
>
> <<Tom, 2 questions for you.
>
> First, when did it become "known" that the BMI data was accurate?  We know
> today that they had the numbers nailed pretty well.  Obviously, Meade
> didn't
> know it.  At what point in history did it become generally understood that
> the BMI was providing accurate info?
>
> Second, was there other intelligence available to Meade?  In other words,
> instead of accepting the BMI numbers, was he in fact accepting as accurate
> other numbers that we know, today, were inaccurate?
>
> Regards, Tim>>
>
> Tim,
>
> The BMI earned a reputation for reliability soon after its establishment
> in
> early 1863.  It cobbled together an accurate picture of Lee's army prior
> to
> the Battle of Chancellorsville using information from a variety of
> sources.
>
> When Meade took over as AoP commander from Hooker, he had available to him
> a high ranking officer who knew about the success of the BMI in the person
> of Provost Marshal General Marsena Patrick -- who was administratively
> responsible for the BMI.  Patrick had a high opinion of the BMI's
> capability
> as seen from his comments in his diary.
>
> Meade also looked to the BMI at Gettysburg to provide information.  There
> are a number of reports in the BMI files that inform Meade about the enemy
> situation.  The BMI's report about the size of Ewell's corps is the best
> example of how accurate their information was.  This is not surprising
> considering the large number of prisoners they had available from which to
> gather this data.
>
> My sense is that Meade had enough information available for him to make a
> judgment as to the reliability of the BMI's reports.  It appears he chose
> not to place high value on them, however, for reasons that are not clear.
> There is also no evidence that he requested the BMI to provide him an
> order
> of battle for Lee's entire army at Gettysburg.
>
> The only other intelligence available to Meade that is known was contained
> in reports from citizens coming through various sources that estimated the
> size of Lee's army anywhere from 80 to 100 thousand as it marched across
> Pennsylvania.  In my opinion, the most reliable of these reports had the
> number at 80K.  The figure came from a number of men who counted the
> passing
> army independently, then compared their figures with each other prior to
> passing them on to the Union command.
>
> During the CW, it was generally accepted that citizen reports were
> unreliable, because they invariably inflated the numbers.  As a result,
> Meade should have been listening to his intelligence staff not people
> along
> the road who had no expertise in these matters.  How he came to the
> conclusion that Lee had over 20,000 more troops at Gettysburg than he
> actually had is unclear.  It is known that Joe Hooker also inflated the
> size
> of Lee's army despite the BMI informing him otherwise.  There is no
> evidence
> that Hooker passed along his beliefs to Meade, however.  Inflating the
> size
> of the enemy does appear to have been an AoP syndrome.
>
> After Gettysburg, Meade began to downgrade the BMI as an all source
> intelligence bureau, and paid the price when forthcoming information
> eventually became erratic.  This was not rectified until Grant arrived and
> assessed the situation as being unacceptable.  He gradually returned the
> BMI
> to its original status, and the bureau played an important role toward the
> latter part of the war in the eventual collapse of the Confederacy.
>
> Hope this addresses your questions.
>
> Regards, Tom
>
>
>
>
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