GDG- BMI

Tom Ryan pennmardel at mchsi.com
Mon Oct 30 20:00:21 CST 2006


<<Tom, 2 questions for you.

First, when did it become "known" that the BMI data was accurate?  We know
today that they had the numbers nailed pretty well.  Obviously, Meade didn't
know it.  At what point in history did it become generally understood that
the BMI was providing accurate info?

Second, was there other intelligence available to Meade?  In other words,
instead of accepting the BMI numbers, was he in fact accepting as accurate
other numbers that we know, today, were inaccurate?

Regards, Tim>>

Tim,

	The BMI earned a reputation for reliability soon after its establishment in
early 1863.  It cobbled together an accurate picture of Lee's army prior to
the Battle of Chancellorsville using information from a variety of sources.

	When Meade took over as AoP commander from Hooker, he had available to him
a high ranking officer who knew about the success of the BMI in the person
of Provost Marshal General Marsena Patrick -- who was administratively
responsible for the BMI.  Patrick had a high opinion of the BMI's capability
as seen from his comments in his diary.

	Meade also looked to the BMI at Gettysburg to provide information.  There
are a number of reports in the BMI files that inform Meade about the enemy
situation.  The BMI's report about the size of Ewell's corps is the best
example of how accurate their information was.  This is not surprising
considering the large number of prisoners they had available from which to
gather this data.

	My sense is that Meade had enough information available for him to make a
judgment as to the reliability of the BMI's reports.  It appears he chose
not to place high value on them, however, for reasons that are not clear.
There is also no evidence that he requested the BMI to provide him an order
of battle for Lee's entire army at Gettysburg.

	The only other intelligence available to Meade that is known was contained
in reports from citizens coming through various sources that estimated the
size of Lee's army anywhere from 80 to 100 thousand as it marched across
Pennsylvania.  In my opinion, the most reliable of these reports had the
number at 80K.  The figure came from a number of men who counted the passing
army independently, then compared their figures with each other prior to
passing them on to the Union command.

	During the CW, it was generally accepted that citizen reports were
unreliable, because they invariably inflated the numbers.  As a result,
Meade should have been listening to his intelligence staff not people along
the road who had no expertise in these matters.  How he came to the
conclusion that Lee had over 20,000 more troops at Gettysburg than he
actually had is unclear.  It is known that Joe Hooker also inflated the size
of Lee's army despite the BMI informing him otherwise.  There is no evidence
that Hooker passed along his beliefs to Meade, however.  Inflating the size
of the enemy does appear to have been an AoP syndrome.

	After Gettysburg, Meade began to downgrade the BMI as an all source
intelligence bureau, and paid the price when forthcoming information
eventually became erratic.  This was not rectified until Grant arrived and
assessed the situation as being unacceptable.  He gradually returned the BMI
to its original status, and the bureau played an important role toward the
latter part of the war in the eventual collapse of the Confederacy.

	Hope this addresses your questions.

Regards, Tom






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