GDG- What if Pickett's charge had worked?

[James Cameron]

<< Stuart
was after Gregg's cavalry, which he had observed there late on the afternoon
of July 2, and which he knew to still be there on July 3, pure and simple.
If Stuart is going to get to the Baltimore Pike or anywhere else, I don't
think he's going to try by going into the teeth of a full division (and
complemented by Custer's brigade) of veteran cavalry to do so.  Makes no
sense at all.  >>

Exactly.  Neither Lee no Stuart ever said that Stuart was sent out to 
cooperate with the infantry assualt.  Certainly, has he seen signs of a 
Union retreat down the Baltimore Pike, and found himself in a position to do 
something positive, he'd have done so, just on general principles.  But if 
interdicting an expected Union retreat was his main mission - much less the 
mythical task of cutting his way into the Union rear as Picket struck its 
front - the last thing he's going to want to do is go up against the first 
Union cavalry division he can find, going out of his way to do so, no less, 
and get bogged down in a costly and time consuming fight.

<< I think Lee's only recipe to destroy an army was his original
one upon advancing into Pennsylvania - that of hopefully engaging the AOP
piecemeal with superior numbers.  It didn't happen, and by the end of July
1, of course, that plan wasn't going to - not at Gettysburg, anyway.  >>

CW armies were notoriously difficult to destroy, even after a serious 
defeat.  Even if Pickett's Charge had succeeded in rendering CH untenable, 
and compelling the AOP to abandone the position at Gettysburg, Lee's 
prospects of destroying the AOP, or even substantial parts of it, were slim. 
There's scant evidence of any effective plans being in place to support the 
attack, much less, exploit any success.  The AOP's formations have still 
well secured access to the Baltimore Pike, the main line of retreat. 
Effective cavalry units support both flanks, and very substantial infantry 
formations, and, artillery, are available and well positioned to establish 
very effective rear guard positions.  The AOP would be withdrawing back 
along its line of communications, whereas the ANV would be, in following, 
moving away from its line of supply and retreat.  Except by capture, it has 
no means of getting more ammunition, artillery in particular.  The AOP faces 
no substantial terrain obstacles, while the ANV, for its part, enjoys no 
advantage in speed or maneuverability.  A retreat by the AOP causes serious 
morale problems, to be sure, and has tremendous political ramifications for 
the Lincoln Administration, but the AOP survives.

Jim Cameron