GDG- Corp size at GB

[Chet Diestel]

Esteemed GDG Member Tom Ryan Contributes:

     In looking at the style of that July 2 meeting rather than the outcome, 
it should be noted that Meade did not take charge of that meeting so to 
speak. He allowed his commanders basically to set the agenda and to talk out 
the strategy.  He did not insert himelf much at all in the discussion and 
readily accepted the consensus.

    Throwing in a "what If" given this particular management style, if the 
commanders had decided that retreat was the best tactic under the 
circumstances, would he have accepted that?  To answer that question we need 
only look at the what happened at the commander's meetings Meade held on 
July 4 and 12.  Meade conducted those meetings using the same management 
style, which was to allow the commanders to dominate the agenda.  So from 
that we may have to conclude that Meade would have accepted his commanders' 
decision on July 2 regardless of whether it was to stay and fight or to 
retreat.

    In contrast, Lee was more of a top down manager, basically deciding 
beforehand what the strategy should be and directing rather than asking what 
should be done.  Of course, Meade was new to the job, and that influenced 
the way he dealt with his commanders.  None the less, his command style did 
not permit him to control events as well as he could or should have, I
believe.

       Tom Ryan

   In regards, to the evening of July 2 council of war, given the make up of 
the senior officers assembled and his long service with them, it is probable 
that Meade knew going in just how each of his now subordinates would come 
down on the matter of staying and fighting or retreating. Thus, Meade did 
not have to take the leadership role, but make it more of a open discussion. 
In short, Meade knew before the council that the decision would be to stay 
and fight it out where they were.
   Part of this may have been Meade's natural disposition for collective 
discussion and decision making as well as his being so new on the job.
  Comparing the July 2 and the meetings of July 4 and 12 is a difficult 
thing to do mainly because one very important factor was missing --- namely, 
Winfield Scott Hancock. Hancock was, as Gen. John J. Pershing in another war 
would describe his best commanders, "a fighter, a fighter and a fighter," 
and had an pleasing yet aggressively dominant personality that naturally 
drew people towards his way of thinking. Thus, would the "meetings of the 
commanders"  basically had been gatherings of Hancock and some other guys in 
uniforms in its outcome. Additionally, Meade had great trust in his junior 
corps commander and would act upon his determination of what direction the 
army should take --- after all, Meade had committed the army to fight at 
Gettysburg largely on Hancock's recommendation.
  Finally, Lee's top down management style works, but only if strong 
supervision is imposed to see that the decision made by the person in 
charge --- be it an army commander or a corporate CEO --- are carried out 
promptly and properly.
   With regards,
            Chet