GDG- Corp size at GB

[Tom Ryan]

<<Thus, Meade's evening conference of July 2 was extremely important in that
it got all the corps commanders, permanent and temporary, on the same page
as to what the army would do in regards to fighting the battle. In many
ways, it was military communication at its best
and another example of why it is a shame just how well Meade fought the
battle is so often overlooked in favor of concentrating on the legion of
Confederate command mistakes.>>

Chet,

	In looking at the style of that July 2 meeting rather than the outcome, it
should be noted that Meade did not take charge of that meeting so to speak.
He allowed his commanders basically to set the agenda and to talk out the
strategy.  He did not insert himelf much at all in the discussion and
readily accepted the consensus.

	Throwing in a "what If" given this particular management style, if the
commanders had decided that retreat was the best tactic under the
circumstances, would he have accepted that?  To answer that question we need
only look at the what happened at the commander's meetings Meade held on
July 4 and 12.  Meade conducted those meetings using the same management
style, which was to allow the commanders to dominate the agenda.  So from
that we may have to conclude that Meade would have accepted his commanders'
decision on July 2 regardless of whether it was to stay and fight or to
retreat.

	In contrast, Lee was more of a top down manager, basically deciding
beforehand what the strategy should be and directing rather than asking what
should be done.  Of course, Meade was new to the job, and that influenced
the way he dealt with his commanders.  None the less, his command style did
not permit him to control events as well as he could or should have, I
believe.

Tom Ryan