GDG- Corp size at GB

[Chet Diestel]

Esteemed GDG Member Alan Brunelle Contributes:

    I wonder if Meade recognized the benefits of having larger "multi-corps" 
units - prior to the battle, he had Reynolds and Slocum directing 2 or 3 
corps as "wings". As Chet noted in his message: perhaps while on maneuver, 
larger units make sense.

    To some extent, it seemed that the AoP's 7 Corps commanders cooperated 
much better than Lee's 3 Corps commanders. On both day 2 and 3, troops were 
being pulled and pushed from one corps to the next in an almost endless 
stream during the assaults. In contrast, other than day 1 - when Hill & 
Ewell attacked at almost the same time - the ANV had significant problems 
getting inter-corps cooperation.

   I think I'm in the camp that states it doesn't matter whether there were 
2, 3, or 7 ANV corps - the number of corps would be less important than the 
makeup of the men leading them. It seems to me that the AoP corps commanders 
(for the most part) seemed to "get along" better, and certainly there seems 
to be more communication between them.

    I wonder how much of this Lee fostered - whereas Meade called those 
all-inclusive councils, Lee's management style almost seemed to encourage 
separate actions: talking to one commander, and then the next... For 
example, was Ewell ever included in conversations directly with Hill or 
Longstreet during the 3 days? I recall Lee, Hill and Longstreet meeting a 
couple of times, but these did not include Ewell. (Some of this is probably 
geographically induced - but I can't imagine that it would have been taxing 
for Lee, Longstreet, Ewell and Hill all to meet near the seminary for 
instance.)

   Perhaps defensive cooperation is easier than during offensive action - as 
in the latter things are much more fluid?

    Regards,
    Alan


   Meade's shifting of troops from critical threat to critical threat on 
July 2 was nearly a textbook example of a commander making superb use of 
interior lines. However, I always thought that Ewell's and Hill's final 
assault on July 1 was one more of the happy coincidence of troops massing at 
the right time and place than any thing resembling a coordinated attack. 
That is, Lee took advantage of a tactical opportunity rather than planning 
for it.
  As for the Union corps commander, the early death on July 1 of Reynolds, 
probably the closest of all senior officers to Meade, removed him as a 
factor in the battle for all intent and purpose and Sickles could hardly be 
described as any commander's cooperative subordinate. Of the remaining five 
corps commander, Sykes was simply a caretaker for the V Corps given that 
position as senior division commander following Meade's promotion and 
Sedgwick's VI Corps did not play an active or vital role in the battle 
itself.
  Therefore, we are left with three corps commanders --- Hancock, II, 
Howard, XI, and Slocum, XII, who, despite some squabbling over sonority, 
functioned well together and from all appearances had Meade's trust (This is 
certainly true of Hancock). Thus, Meade's evening conference of July 2 was 
extremely important in that it got all the corps commanders, permanent and 
temporary, on the same page as to what the army would do in regards to 
fighting the battle. In many ways, it was military communication at its best 
and another example of why it is a shame just how well Meade fought the 
battle is so often overlooked in favor of concentrating on the legion of 
Confederate command mistakes.
  But if we must cite ANV command mistakes, none can be more glaring than 
the lack of proper and continuing communications between its senior 
commanders. Geography played a role, certainly, but there was never anything 
approaching a council of war such as Meade's and therefore, not the tight 
control needed by a general commanding in a desperate battle.
   With regards,
          Chet