GDG- Arty Anti-personnel Effectiveness

[ccj at infionline.net]

Norm,

To add to Bruce's comments and to provide some additional information--not 
so much a full response to your query--that may shed some light on Lee's 
expectations, it may be useful to consider the artillery bombardment that 
preceded the PPT Charge in the light of the customary missions of the 
artillery branch.  The artillery was not expected on its own to destroy the 
defender by causing personnel casualties and materiel damage.  It would be 
unheard of for such a thing to happen--then or now.  The bombardment was a 
preparatory fire.  It was meant to kill and damage, but it was also meant to 
suppress and neutralize, breaking up through psychological and physical 
(morale) effects the combat power of the defense.  Lee did not know the 
combat power of the defense, but he undoubtedly knew that whatever it was, 
it would be reduced by the bombardment.  It was still necessary, as it 
always has been, for the infantry to take and hold the objective.  The real 
problem for the Confederates was that there was too much combat power on 
Cemetery Ridge, and mathematically, they weren't going to be budged by what 
Lee could bring to bear against them.

Kind regards,
Curt Johnson


----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Norman Levitt" <njlevitt at hotmail.com>
To: <gettysburg at arthes.com>
Sent: Thursday, November 30, 2006 9:43 AM
Subject: Re: GDG- Arty Anti-personnel Effectiveness


> Esteemed GDG Member Contributes:
>
>
>
>
>>From: Batrinque at aol.com
>>Reply-To: GDG <gettysburg at arthes.com>
>>To: gettysburg at arthes.com
>>Subject: Re: GDG- Arty Anti-personnel  Effectiveness
>>Date: Wed, 29 Nov 2006 21:46:30 EST
>>
>>Esteemed GDG Member Contributes:
>>
>>
>>In a message dated 11/29/06 1:09:20 PM Pacific Standard Time,
>>ccj at infionline.net writes:
>>
>> > Please note: There was little real difference between the
>> > artillery materiel of the Franco-Prussian War and that of the Civil 
>> > War.
>> > The famous French "75" to which you refer was introduced for service in
>> > 1898.  It had the long-recoil cylinder that made it the first modern
>> > quick-firing field gun.  The German 77mm C 96 n/A followed soon after
>>and
>> > was in service in World War I.
>> >
>>
>>I think that we must keep in mind that due to the nature of the munitions,
>>the lethality of CW artillery was much different at close (canister) range 
>>than
>>at long (exploding shell and exploding case) range.  I suspect we are
>>unconsciously influenced by 20th Century experience where artillery rounds 
>>filled with
>>high explosives were far, far more lethal at long range than their
>>counterparts of the century before.  CW explosive shells were thick-walled 
>>and contained
>>a rather small powder charge sufficient to burst the casing and not much
>>more.  Doctrine called for employing canister at ranges up to 200 or 300 
>>yards,
>>then solid shot for the next few hundred yards (yes, a solid 12-pound ball 
>>or
>>10-pound bolt could do nasty things to the human body, but their overall
>>lethality was dwarfed by the spray of shot from canister at shorter 
>>ranges).  And
>>beyond that, exploding shells/case were called for, ideally exploding over 
>>the
>>heads of enemy troops, showering them with shell fragments (and balls from
>>exploding case).  But to do this took considerable skill (and some luck) 
>>with the
>>types of fuses in use.  Certainly, sometimes an individual exploding shell
>>might inflict a number of casualties, but can we realistically compare  it 
>>with
>>what canister did at much shorter ranges?
>>
>>Once again, I point to the low power of explosives used in shells.  Early
>>high explosives -- including dynamite -- were too unstable to be fired 
>>from
>>cannons by conventional means -- the shell would detonate while being 
>>fired.  This
>>led to a curious development late in the 19th century: the "dynamite gun",
>>"dynamite referring to the projectile, not the projecting charge.  Such
>>"dynamite" projectiles were propelled by compressed air to avoid too great 
>>a shock
>>during discharge.  Both US Army and Navy versions were employed to a 
>>limited
>>extent during the Spanish-American War.  But these low-velocity, 
>>short-range
>>weapons proved a technological dead end when more stable high explosives, 
>>capable of
>>withstanding the shock of firing from a gun, were developed, leading to 
>>the
>>truly lethal artillery of WW1 and after.  (And, of course, the employment 
>>of
>>rapid-firing breech-loading cannon added to that lethality.)
>>
>>If data exists that distinguishes between casualties inflicted by canister
>>versus those from other artillery rounds, a comparison would be very
>>interesting.  From everything I have seen, the number of such casualties 
>>drastically drop
>>after a few hundred yards.
>>]
>>
>>Bruce Trinque
>>Amston, CT
>>                    ----------------------------------------------------------------
>
>
> This very useful summary brings up a question that has always intrigued 
> me, but for which I have never found a satisfactory answer:  Why did Lee 
> expect so much of the famous artillery barrage of July 3, in view of the 
> unreliability of case shot (very unreliable, so far as Confederate 
> munitions went), and the extreme range of most of his gun-line? 
> Relatively small-bore field pieces simply didn't have much killing power 
> with those munitions at that distance, and could not have been expected to 
> do much to scatter a line of seasoned veterans.  Moreover, the barrage 
> pretty well exhausted Lee's batteries and kept them from moving up with 
> the PPT advance to support those troops at close range (presumably with 
> cannister or grape).
>
> Why were these weaknesses not obvious to a commander of Lee's experience 
> and sagacity?  Are there any useful sources?
>
> NL
>