GDG- Meade and Lee's retreat from Gettysburg

[Don Avery]

I'm not sure I would totally equate low casualties as "fresh". I think we
must consider the hard marches to GB and the fighting that took place. In
addition as was said earlier, there was a large loss of Union commanders and
reorg/refit was needed. I don't fault Meade for not chasing Lee earlier.

-----Original Message-----
From: gettysburg-bounces at arthes.com
[mailto:gettysburg-bounces at arthes.com]On Behalf Of Tom Ryan
Sent: Sunday, October 29, 2006 12:53 PM
To: GDG
Subject: RE: GDG- Meade and Lee's retreat from Gettysburg


Esteemed GDG Member Contributes:


Bill Gower asked "If Meade had access to a reserve of unused troops such as
McClellan had after Antietam, would Meade have been more aggressive in
following up and engaging Lee during the retreat?"  If "unused" means units
that did not suffer greatly in battle, then Meade had a considerable reserve
of these units -- especially in comparison to the damage done to the
Confederate army.  The Sixth Corps suffered only 2% casualties, the Twelfth
Corps a relatively low 11%, and even the Fifth Corps had just 20%
casualties.  Compared to the Union First, Second, Third and Eleventh Corps
that Had 50, 39, 40 and 41% casualties, and the Confederate First, Second
and Third Corps that had 37, 33 and 39% casualties, these Union units were
unscathed or at least relatively unscathed.

Therefore, if we accept these figures that are derived from "Regimental
Strengths and Losses," Meade had three corps available for combat that were
in considerable better shape than the enemy's army.  Add to this a cavalry
corps that had taken only 7% losses during the fighting, and you have a
formidable force that could have been used for any offensive strategy that
Meade wished to pursue.

Meade's "reserve" was further enhanced by reinforcements numbering in the
vicinity of 10,000 troops that joined the AoP as it marched in pursuit of
Lee's army.  Another factor that is generally ignored in the "reserve"
equation is more than 25,000 mixed regular troops and militia that were
available to Meade in Pennsylvania and Maryland during the retreat and
pursuit that he chose not to call upon.

Therefore, a strong argument can be made that Meade had reserves of fresh
troops in large numbers to support offensive action.  The other part of
Bill's question "would Meade have been more aggressive in following up and
engaging Lee during the retreat?" has to be addressed in the context of the
picture as outlined above.  Since Meade was not more aggressive despite his
superior numbers, the reasons why I believe relate to three major
considerations.  First, Meade deferred to the consensus of his commanders
rather than directing them to take action; second, Meade misread the
available evidence and believed the enemy army was much stronger than it
actually was; and third, Meade, being new to the position, was tentative in
assuming responsibility for engaging in more aggressive tactics and, as a
result, adopted a cautious approach that would not undermine his victory at
Gettysburg.

Tom Ryan

-----Original Message-----
From: gettysburg-bounces at arthes.com
[mailto:gettysburg-bounces at arthes.com]On Behalf Of Richard M Kadas
Sent: Tuesday, October 24, 2006 10:07 PM
To: GDG
Subject: Re: GDG- Meade and Lee's retreat from Gettysburg


Esteemed GDG Member Contributes:


Why don't you consider the 6th Corps as a reserve of fresh troops. They
arrived at GB in the evening of 2 July and had suffered few casualties.
  Dick
James Cameron <cameron2 at optonline.net> wrote:
  Esteemed GDG Member Contributes:


<< Does anyone want to offer an opinion on a question that I have regarding
Lee
and Meade and the retreat? If Meade had access to a reserve of unused
troops such as McClellan had after Antietam, would Meade have been more
aggressive in following up and engaging Lee during the retreat? >>

An excellent question, to which my response would be that I don't know.
I'm sure having substantial numbers of fresh troops on hand would have made
some difference, but then again, this wouldn't necessary change the problems
of weather, road conditions, supply, and Confederate defensive measures he
had to contend with.

Jim Cameron


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