GDG- "Absurd to suppose he can safely engage Lee now"

[Tom Ryan]

<<<<General Meade telegraph to Halleck at 3 P.M. on July 28:

``I am making every effort to prepare this army for an advance. . . . I am
in hopes to commence the movement to-morrow, when I shall first throw over
a cavalry force to feel for the enemy, and cross the infantry as fast as
possible. . . .

``No reliable intelligence of the position of the enemy has been obtained.
He pickets the Rappahannock from Fredericksburg to Rappahannock Station.
These pickets, however, seem to be mere `lookouts,' to warn him of my
approach.

``Contradictory reports . . . place the main body, some at Gordonsville,
others say at Staunton and Charlottesville, and some assert the retreat has
been extended to Richmond. My own expectation is that he will be found
behind the line of the Rapidan. . . .

``P.S. 4 p.m.---A scout just returned . . . reports the enemy have repaired
the railroad bridge across the Rapidan, and are using the road to Culpeper
Court-House; that Lee has been re-enforced by D. H. Hill, reported with
10,000 men, and that he intends to make a stand at Culpeper or in its
vicinity.>>>>

	That scout was actually a six-man team under the Sgt. Milton Cline who was
part of Col. George Sharpe's Bureau of Military Information, the AoP's
intelligence staff.  Cline frequently worked behind enemy lines in Rebel
uniform to obtain information.  Cline was known to mix in easily with
Confederate forces, and ride along with them until he obtained sufficient
information before disappearing and crossing back into Union lines to report
to Sharpe.

	On July 28, Sharpe reported to Gen. Humphreys, Meade's chief of staff, that
Cline's team had just returned.  Cline reported light pickets at the fords
upstream on the Rappahannock, and that he learned that a portion of
Longstreet's corps was at Culpeper and the remainder had gone on to
Gordonsville.  He reported that "it is believed that Lee's HQ is at Culpeper
where it will remain until the army has passed below."

	Cline learned from "reliable sources" that the "rebel army is much
demoralized and their trains and animals in a bad condition.  The mules and
horses being very poor and dying along the road. Wagons have broken down.
Many have been (drawn?) up & hid in the mountains or burned for fear of
their falling into our hands and that an attack from our forces is feared
before thay can pass Culpeper."

	Cline also reported that the fords and river were guarded by Fitz Lee's
brigade of Stuart's cav "which is almost unserviceable, having had no grain
rations reach them for the last seven days.  The horses are unfit for duty."

	Cline said that Fredericksburg was held only by a small cav force and the
"sick and wounded" men.  He also learned from a family "who supposed him [to
be] a Confederate" where he stopped for dinner that many Rebel soldiers had
stopped there for food the last several days and had expressed "great
dissatisfaction at their condition and prospects since their return from Pa.
[i.e. Gettysburg] and attributed all their deserters to that invasion."

	This latter item about deserters is particularly interesting because there
was an intelligence report that a lot of Rebel stragglers were hiding in the
woods when the Confederate army was still at Williamsport.

	Cline closed by stating that he was planning to set up a point d'appui or
support base for scouts to cross the river safely so that they could recon
into enemy territory.

	This report came from the BMI files at the National Archives.  Meade's
message to Halleck that Bob cited was obviously based on this information.

Tom Ryan