GDG- July 22, 1863 - Al, OH & NYT

[Dennis Lawrence]

To Oliver O. Howard [1]
Executive Mansion,
My dear General Howard Washington, July 21. 1863.

Your letter of the 18th. is received. I was deeply mortified by the escape 
of Lee across the Potomac, because the substantial destruction of his army 
would have ended the war, and because I believed, such destruction was 
perfectly easy---believed that Gen. Meade and his noble army had expended 
all the skill, and toil, and blood, up to the ripe harvest, and then let 
the crop go to waste. Perhaps my mortification was heightened because I had 
always believed---making my belief a hobby possibly---that the main rebel 
army going North of the Potomac, could never return, if well attended to; 
and because I was so greatly flattered in this belief, by the operations at 
Gettysburg. A few days having passed, I am now profoundly grateful for what 
was done, without criticism for what was not done. Gen. Meade has my 
confidence as a brave and skillful officer, and a true man. Yours very 
truly A. LINCOLN


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. General Howard's letter of July 18, marked ``Unofficial'' by Howard, reads:

``Having noticed in the newspapers certain statements bearing upon the 
battles [sic] of Gettysburg and subsequent operations which I deem 
calculated to convey a wrong impression to your mind, I wish to submit a 
few statements. The successful issue of the battle of Gettysburg was due 
mainly to the energetic operations of our present commanding General prior 
to the engagement and to the manner in which he handled his troops on the 
field. The reserves have never before during the war been thrown in at just 
the right moment. . . . Moreover I have never seen a more hearty 
co-operation on the part of General officers as since General Meade took 
the command.

``As to not attacking the enemy prior to leaving his stronghold beyond the 
Antietam it is by no means certain that the repulse of Gettysburg might not 
have been turned upon us; at any rate the Commanding General was in favor 
of an immediate attack but with the evident difficulties in our way the 
uncertainty of a success and the strong conviction of our best military 
minds against the risk, I must say, that I think the General acted wisely.

``As to my request to make a reconnaissance on the morning of the 14th 
which the papers state was refused; the facts are, that the General had 
required me to reconnoitre the evening before and give my opinion as to the 
practicability of making a lodgement on the enemy's left, and his answer to 
my subsequent request was, that the movements he had already ordered would 
subserve the same purpose.

``We have, if I may be allowed to say it, a Commanding General in whom all 
the officers, with whom I have come in contact, express complete 
confidence. I have said this much because of the censure and of the 
misrepresentations which have grown out of the escape of Lee's army.''
.
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Howard doubtless referred to a Washington dispatch of July 17, entitled 
``The Escape of Lee's Army,'' appearing in the New York Tribune of July 18, 
stating

  ``The President sent two dispatches to Gen. Meade a day or two before the 
escape of the enemy across the river, in both of which he urged the 
necessity of an immediate attack. In one of these dispatches he said he 
thought all the appearances indicated that no other occasion would speedily 
arise offering circumstances so favorable to us and so unfavorable to the 
enemy. He therefore wished a battle to be delivered at once. In the council 
of war which decided against attacking Gen. Lee, at a time when subsequent 
disclosures have shown only two-thirds of his army, perhaps forty thousand 
men would have been in line to receive our soldiers flushed with victory, 
the other third having already crossed, the Generals who pronounced against 
the attack were [John] Sedgwick, [George] Sykes, [William H.] French, 
[Alexander] Hays and [Henry W.] Slocum. Those in favor of attack were 
Generals Meade, Howard, Pleasonton, and [James S.] Wadsworth, temporarily 
commanding the First Corps, (Gen. John Newton being sick), with Generals 
[Andrew A.] Humphreys and [Gouverneur K.] Warren, of Gen. Meade's staff. 
The last named made a powerful speech, in which he showed the necessity of 
immediate movement. Gen. Wadsworth also, adding his voice to his vote, 
insisted with all his might that there was the occasion to destroy Lee's army.''