GDG- war councils

[Richard & Sue Ann Schaus]

-----Original Message-----
From: gettysburg-bounces at arthes.com
[mailto:gettysburg-bounces at arthes.com] On Behalf Of J. David Petruzzi
Sent: Wednesday, December 06, 2006 11:41 PM
To: GDG
Subject: RE: GDG- war councils

Esteemed GDG Member Contributes:

<<Meade indeed sent cavalry orders through Alf, as was proper.  Meade
acted as
such with all the corps.  As for his possible role at the council, my
impression is that Meade did not have the appreciation for the offensive
role that cavalry could play that, say, Grant later did (although
through
much effort by Sheridan, admittedly).  Meade doesn't seem to have that
appreciation all through the balance of '63 and early '64.  Meade has
very
little to directly order the cavalry to do at Gettysburg, virtually
deferring to Pleasonton's ideas.  And we know how much of that came
out...
on the morning of July 2, Pleasonton ordered Buford off the field while
not
replacing him.  Upon finding out that he is bereft of cavalry, Meade hit
the
roof.  Early on the morning of July 3, Pleasonton twice orders Gregg to
leave the right flank, something that Gregg (to his credit) refused
twice to
do.  Then ECF breaks out.  Pleasonton issued two major orders for the
cavalry at Gettysburg - one to Buford, one to Gregg, each to vacate
their
positions - and each had or had the potential to create ponderously
disastrous results.>>

Best regards,
J.D.


Hi J.D.,

Thanks for the info.

It appears that Meade's effort to better control Pleasonton by keeping
him near HQ did not work so well.

According to the OR the order that caused Buford's departure originated
from Meade, not Pleasonton.

"July 2, 1863
Commanding Officer Cavalry Corps:
The Major-general commanding directs that General Buford collect all
trains in the vicinity of Taneytown and take them down to Westminster.
Very respectfully, &c.,
Danl. Butterfield
Major-General, Chief of Staff."
(OR 27, Part III, pp 1086)

Meade may not have been overly well versed on the use of cavalry, but he
knew the meaning of having a unit relieved, and Meade does not specify
that Buford was to be relieved by another cavalry unit.
With Pleasonton close by, Meade could easily have verified if cavalry
units were on hand to relieve Buford, if he had wanted Buford relieved
by cavalry.  Pleasonton could have told him that Buford's, as far as I
know, was his only cavalry at Gettysburg at that time.  Did Pleasonton
have any cavalry available to relieve Buford? 
Instead, Meade made the mistake of assuming that other cavalry units
were on hand.
Later, he did instruct Pleasonton to replace Buford, which never
happened, but the damage had been done and, IMO, Meade has to bear much
of the blame.

Buford wrote that he was relieved by the 3rd Corps, and apparently did
not find his relief by infantry instead of cavalry unusual.

Maybe you can help me out here, I am of the impression that Buford must
have spoken directly with Meade, probably sometime on the morning of 2
July, and related to the CG the condition of his command.  And, that
elements of the 3rd Corps were at the PO area and could relieve his
troopers.
The message on page 490, of the OR, Part III, states in part, "...and
did not understand when he gave the permission to Buford to go to
Westminister;..." indicates communication between Buford and Meade.
Meade's message did not specify that only part of Buford's command was
to move to TT.
That would explain the order coming from Meade's HQ, as well as Buford's
apparent lack of concern of being relieved by infantry.


Have you seen a copy of Pleasonton's message to Buford, instructing him
to move to TT and then Westmiinster?

VR, Rick Schaus



 
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