GDG- war councils

[Tom Ryan]

<<The retreat is also an example.  Meade is not proactive in directing the
cavalry through Pleasonton.  Pleasonton then parses out his brigades in what
turns out to be a wholly non-cohesive effort to stop Lee from crossing the
Potomac.  Had Pleasonton kept a large part of his force together and
attempted to get behind Lee, blocking his path, results may have been
different if they were successful in dealing with Stuart's masterful
performance during the retreat.>>

J.D.,

	Well said.  The mishandling of the Union cavalry during the pursuit of
Lee's forces from Gettysburg was textbook on how not to command cavalry in
this type of situation.  Pleasonton's orders lacked specificity.  They read
"gain [the enemy's] rear and line of communication, and harass and annoy him
as much as posssible in his retreat."  The cavalry followed those orders to
the tee, and made no serious effort to block Lee's army, especially as it
passed through South Mountain at Monterey Pass.

	It must be said, however, that Buford and Kilpatrick had an opportunity to
destroy the wagon train shepherded by Imboden's cavalry brigade at
Williamsport, but failed in that effort for a number of reasons.  If they
had been successful, at the very least Lee would have been deprived of a
good deal of his transportation capability, and would have lost considerable
supplies and munitions -- not to mention he would have had to leave most of
his wounded men behind when and if he did escape across the river with his
army.

	Buford/Kilpatrick could also have cut the cable lines for the flatboat
ferries that were shuttling supplies and ammunition from the south shore to
Imboden and eventually to Lee's army when it arrived.  The loss of those
flat boats also would have meant that Lee would have had a more difficullt
time taking the 3000-4000 Union prisoners along with him.

	Having said that, B/K would not have been able to hold that position for
long, with Stuart's larger cavalry force bearing down on him with Lee's army
right behind it.  Unlike July 1 at Gettysburg when Buford held the line
until Reynolds corps got up and relieved him, at Williamsport the Union army
would not begin to arrive for another two or three days.  So the cavalry
would have had to abandon their position at Willimsport, even if they had
overwhelmed Imboden.

	Pleasonton gets bad marks overall for his direction of the cavalry, and
Buford and Kilpatrick have to assume some of the blame for their lack of
success on July 6 at Williamsport and vicinity.  I beleive that quick and
decisive action by their much larger force would have defeated Imboden, and
given them time to destroy the wagon train and flat boats before the arrival
of Stuart's cavalry.

	Would appreciate your take on this.

Regards, Tom