GDG- war councils

[J. David Petruzzi]

>>Hi J.D.

You'll get no argument from me that Pleasonton was often a better author
of historical fiction than nonfiction.

Having said that, his story of being ordered to gather artillery and
cavalry to cover a withdrawal seems almost too big a whopper, even for
Pleasonton.  It could be so easily shot down by anyone close to Meade.
I don't recall any of those close to Meade shooting him down, did
anyone?
I wonder if it's possible that he was directed to identify units that
could cover a withdrawal if necessary, and he typically overstated his
orders?

Even though he was more of a glorified staff officer than a cavalry
corps commander at Gettysburg, Meade still sent the cavalry orders to
him.  His input on the status/location of the cavalry should have been
important to the council.  I do find it hard to believe that his
presence was not requested at the council.
I believe that both Hunt and Tyler had been requested to attend, but
arrived after it had ended.

VR, Rick Schaus>>

Hey Rick,

I really don't see the claim as that big of a whopper for Alf.  In that same
article, he claims, just as one example, that his orders for what resulted
in the battle of Brandy Station was simply a recon and that he wasn't
actually to engage the enemy.  All one has to do, of course, is read his
orders in the OR from Hooker to see that Pleasonton is full of hot air.

Just one of many examples in that article and several others he wrote, plus
third party claims that we have.  As for folks coming forward to dispute
him, that did happen in many cases - his outlandish claims about his role at
Chancellorsville for one - but in this case about the war council, it simply
may be that no one disputed him in writing.  It is said that Hooker howled
when reading Pleasonton's silliness about the Gettysburg Campaign, but no
written refutation by Hooker has ever surfaced.

I think, perhaps, that so many officers and subordinates were so used to
Pleasonton's puffing by the 1870's and 1880's that he eventually became more
of a sad, tragic figure than one anyone cared to use as a punching bag.

Meade indeed sent cavalry orders through Alf, as was proper.  Meade acted as
such with all the corps.  As for his possible role at the council, my
impression is that Meade did not have the appreciation for the offensive
role that cavalry could play that, say, Grant later did (although through
much effort by Sheridan, admittedly).  Meade doesn't seem to have that
appreciation all through the balance of '63 and early '64.  Meade has very
little to directly order the cavalry to do at Gettysburg, virtually
deferring to Pleasonton's ideas.  And we know how much of that came out...
on the morning of July 2, Pleasonton ordered Buford off the field while not
replacing him.  Upon finding out that he is bereft of cavalry, Meade hit the
roof.  Early on the morning of July 3, Pleasonton twice orders Gregg to
leave the right flank, something that Gregg (to his credit) refused twice to
do.  Then ECF breaks out.  Pleasonton issued two major orders for the
cavalry at Gettysburg - one to Buford, one to Gregg, each to vacate their
positions - and each had or had the potential to create ponderously
disastrous results.

The retreat is also an example.  Meade is not proactive in directing the
cavalry through Pleasonton.  Pleasonton then parses out his brigades in what
turns out to be a wholly non-cohesive effort to stop Lee from crossing the
Potomac.  Had Pleasonton kept a large part of his force together and
attempted to get behind Lee, blocking his path, results may have been
different if they were successful in dealing with Stuart's masterful
performance during the retreat.

Best regards,
J.D.