GDG- war councils

[Tom Ryan]

Did not see this posted.  Resending in case it got lost.

-----Original Message-----
From: Tom Ryan [mailto:pennmardel at mchsi.com]
Sent: Tuesday, December 05, 2006 9:57 AM
To: rbrinton at charter.net
Subject: RE: war councils


<<Tom,
    For the record, I'm pretty nuetral on Meade - if you could show him to be an empty hat, it's okay with me. On the face of it, it would seem that his style at least left it open for debate. Why he acted as he did will probably go as unanswered as what he would have done had his commanders voted to catch the next train south on July 2 - but interesting to wonder. 

              Best Regards, Rich>>

Rich,

	As mentioned earlier to Chuck, there is no intent to demean or to eulogize Meade in this discussion -- only to examine his way of doing business.  It has to be remembered that Meade's one great success as an independent army commander was winning the battle of Gettysburg.  Looking at the situation objectively, everything was on a downhill slope after that until Grant became general-in-chief and directed Meade's activities.

	Obviously, as a result, it is important to examine Meade's decisions following the repulse of the assault on the Union center on July 3 to learn more about him as a leader.  Evaluating his decision making process during meetings with his commanders provides insight into his leadership qualities.  

	Meade's relative lack of success following Gettysburg is not without good reason.  Even a cursory look at his record reflects his strained relationship with political authorities, lack of rapport with the press, a controversial use of cavalry, and a misunderstanding of the intelligence process.  A poor record on one or two of these important issues is enough to undermine a commander, let alone having problems mastering all four.

	My reading is that Meade was a competent corps commander who had the right combination of skills to fight a set-piece battle at Gettysburg, but lacked the skillset for more sophisticated military strategy that required the support and acceptance of political and public authorities.

	To relegate discussion of Meade to his success at Gettysburg and evaluate him on that  achievement alone, would make it difficult to understand why he struggled in the aftermath.

Regards, Tom