GDG- war councils

Mon Dec 4 15:41:16 CST 2006

-----Original Message-----
From: gettysburg-bounces at arthes.com
[mailto:gettysburg-bounces at arthes.com] On Behalf Of Tom Ryan
Sent: Monday, December 04, 2006 11:41 AM
To: GDG
Subject: RE: GDG- war councils

Esteemed GDG Member Contributes:

Rich,

	<<The point I think worth considering is whether Meade
acquiensced with, deferred to, went along with (however it is best
described) the opinion of the majority on July 2, just as he did on July
4 and 12.  Asking the question of what Meade would have done if the
majority voted to retreat on July 2, helps to frame this issue.

	Regarding the answer to this question, one piece of evidence is
John Gibbon's recollection of the July 2 meeting as reported in Battles
and Leaders (Vol. III, pages 313-14).  Gibbon says that upon the
completion of the voting "Meade said quietly, but decidedly, 'Such then
is the decision;' and certainly he said nothing which produced a doubt
in my mind as to his being perfectly in accord with the members of the
council."

	I think we can learn a couple of things about Meade's decision
making process from this account (if it is in fact accurate).  Meade not
only did not hesitate to give his concurrence with the decision of the
majority, he apparently injected nothing of his own thinking into the
process pro or con.  This, I conclude, is not a good sign that he would
have held out against the majority if the vote had gone the other way.

	It would have been more reassuring that Meade was in charge of
the situation if he had expressed himself regarding the correctness of
the decision, and the importance of the army staying in place on
Cemetery Ridge.  To not have verbally reinforced what the commanders had
decided leaves the impression that he was, in fact, deferring to them.
Since he did defer to them on July 4 and 12 adds greater weight to this
conclusion. 

	While this is certainly not airtight, I think the evidence leans
more toward Meade deferring to his commanders in all three cases, then
it does in the other direction.>>

Tom Ryan

Hi,

Tom, If I may add to this discussion, Hancock, after the war, related
the 2 July council details to artist James Kelly (who drew a picture of
the council).
Hancock stated that he told the council, "At this (the question whether
to stay at Gettysburg or withdraw to PC) I got mad.  I said, "as long as
the enemy stays.  Let us have no more retreats.  The Army of the Potomac
has had too many retreats.  Let us have no more flank movements.  Let
this be our last retreat."  That was about all I said.
After considerable discussion, it was voted to fight them, at which
General Meade who had been walking up and down the room said: "As you
wish gentlemen; but Gettysburg is no place to fight a battle in; Lee can
turn our flanks."",(Styple, "Generals in Bronze", pp 66).

In a postwar letter, Slocum related a very similar account of Meade's
statement.
Doubleday related that he had heard the same account from one of
Birney's staff officers.

Also from Styple's book, is Kelly's account of his meeting with General
Martin McMahon, who served as Sedgwick's Chief of Staff.  McMahon
related a 2 July conversation with Sedgwick, "Gen. Sedgwick called me
about nine [P.M. July 2] saying that he had been called to a council at
General Meade's Headquarters and I rode with him part of the way.  He
said that General Meade was thinking of a retreat and I said, "For God's
sake General, don't you favor any such move.  Why here we have been
hunting for Lee for weeks and now that we've got him here, don't
retreat..." (pp 84).

Meade, during the battle, related to his artillery chief, Hunt that he
would not have selected the ground on which the battle was fought.

Meade appears to have determined to go along with whatever his generals
voted to do, whether or not he agreed with the vote, as he clearly
stated at the 2 July council that he did not agree.

He was given command of the army, but never actually "took" command at
Gettysburg, consistently deferring (I think that word is appropriate) to
the opinions of his corps commanders, and Warren.
Yes, he was new to army command, but he was familiar with the army and
his corps commanders, having served with the AoP through its major
battles in the 1st and 5th Corps.

Meade, at Gettysburg, was the only general wearing two stars on his
shoulder straps that was in command of the AoP, and subject to his
orders from his superiors in Washington.  His corps commanders were
responsible only for their individual corps.  In order to follow his
orders, he would have to make decisions that his subordinate commanders
might not agree with.  He was not willing to make those decisions.  

VR, Rick Schaus 

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