GDG- RE: War Councils

[RC rutler]

Another thought on this ...

One must also wonder if Meade intentionally let his Lieutenants believe that 
it was much their decision to stay and fight, even if he either agreed with 
them or was pre-disposed as to the decision. This would give them buy-in and 
an additional incentive to fight to win (not to say that they might have 
acted any less professionally if they voted otherwise).  But look at the 
other side - Longstreet is oft-criticized for intentionally disrupting Lee's 
attack plan on 2 Jul, because he did not agree with Lee's decision.

I am not sure how consistent this theory is with Meade's decisions of 4 and 
12 Jul.


Craig


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The point I think worth considering is whether Meade acquiensced with, 
deferred to, went along with (however it is best described) the opinion of 
the majority on July 2, just as he did on July 4 and 12.  Asking the 
question of what Meade would have done if the majority voted to
retreat on July 2, helps to frame this issue.

Regarding the answer to this question, one piece of evidence is John 
Gibbon's recollection of the July 2 meeting as reported in Battles and 
Leaders (Vol. III, pages 313-14).  Gibbon says that upon the completion of 
the voting "Meade said quietly, but decidedly, 'Such then is the decision;' 
and certainly he said nothing which produced a doubt in my mind as to his 
being
perfectly in accord with the members of the council."

I think we can learn a couple of things about Meade's decision making 
process from this account
(if it is in fact accurate).  Meade not only did not hesitate to give his 
concurrence with the
decision of the majority, he apparently injected nothing of his own thinking 
into the process
pro or con.  This, I conclude, is not a good sign that he would have held 
out against the
majority if the vote had gone the other way.

It would have been more reassuring that Meade was in charge of the situation 
if he had
expressed himself regarding the correctness of the decision, and the 
importance of the army
staying in place on Cemetery Ridge.  To not have verbally reinforced what 
the commanders had
decided leaves the impression that he was, in fact, deferring to them.  
Since he did defer to
them on July 4 and 12 adds greater weight to this conclusion.

While this is certainly not airtight, I think the evidence leans more toward 
Meade deferring to
his commanders in all three cases, then it does in the other direction.

Tom Ryan

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