GDG- war councils

[Tom Ryan]

<<I don't entirely disagree with your synopsis of the councils held by McClellan and Meade. If you hadn't used the word "deferred" as appllied to Meade's July 2 council, I would have read it and been in complete agreement. Perhaps it is just semantics. 
  To me, it implys Meade either had no position or he changed it after hearing his commander's thoughts. As I said earlier, I think July 2 was a case of Meade confirming a position he already held. I think he knew, in any case, that he could no more disengage with Lee than Lee could disengage with him.
  As far as the councils of July 4 and July 12, I'm  not comfortable enough with all the circumstances to have an opinion. On those dates I will happily defer to you :)>>

Rich,

	The point I think worth considering is whether Meade acquiensced with, deferred to, went along with (however it is best described) the opinion of the majority on July 2, just as he did on July 4 and 12.  Asking the question of what Meade would have done if the majority voted to retreat on July 2, helps to frame this issue.

	Regarding the answer to this question, one piece of evidence is John Gibbon's recollection of the July 2 meeting as reported in Battles and Leaders (Vol. III, pages 313-14).  Gibbon says that upon the completion of the voting "Meade said quietly, but decidedly, 'Such then is the decision;' and certainly he said nothing which produced a doubt in my mind as to his being perfectly in accord with the members of the council."

	I think we can learn a couple of things about Meade's decision making process from this account (if it is in fact accurate).  Meade not only did not hesitate to give his concurrence with the decision of the majority, he apparently injected nothing of his own thinking into the process pro or con.  This, I conclude, is not a good sign that he would have held out against the majority if the vote had gone the other way.

	It would have been more reassuring that Meade was in charge of the situation if he had expressed himself regarding the correctness of the decision, and the importance of the army staying in place on Cemetery Ridge.  To not have verbally reinforced what the commanders had decided leaves the impression that he was, in fact, deferring to them.  Since he did defer to them on July 4 and 12 adds greater weight to this conclusion. 

	While this is certainly not airtight, I think the evidence leans more toward Meade deferring to his commanders in all three cases, then it does in the other direction.

Tom Ryan