GDG- war councils

[Tom Ryan]

<<Meade later bristled at the suggestion that he was deferring to a vote of
his corps commanders, and for that reason did not want these meetings to be
called "councils of war."

Tom, I think your analysis is on target, though the word "deferred"  is not
one I would use. He knew the final call was his and I think he was willing
to make it. As a professional soldier, he well knew that army high
command is not a democracy. However, under the circumstances, being new to
army command and wanting to make the very best call under precarious
conditions, I would hesitate to fault him for the method he used.>>

	In determining Meade's modus operandi at Gettysburg and beyond, we have to
examine what he did not what we think he would do.  That is what I am
attempting to do by considering how he conducted business in all his
meetings with commanders.  I am not attempting to fault him or praise him.
I want to know how he operated, and whether this mindset had any bearing on
the outcome of the Gettysburg Campaign and on his generalship after that
campaign.

<<However, your question is a good one and an unsettling one: would Meade
have decided to stay had a majority of his lieutenants on the night of July
2 expressed their opinion that a retreat was in order?>>

	Exactly.  Since there is no possible answer to that question, we have to
look elsewhere for clues -- such as how he conducted business in the July 4
and 12 meetings.

<<I think Meade deserves credit and honor for his command of the army at
Gettysburg, but I also well know that anyone who questions his leadership in
any way does so at some peril. There are some today who take umbrage at the
idea that Meade at critical moments was uncertain what to do.>>

	If, in fact, there are people who refuse to analyze the actions of Meade or
any other commander at Gettysburg on the basis that it might impinge upon
their reputation, that is shortsighted on their part and unfortunate.

	Thanks for your input.

Tom Ryan