GDG- war councils

[rbrinton at charter.net]

 Hello again Tom,
   Your recent post :
              
              <<    Hi Rich, 
 
	I agree totally with your point that Meade appreciated that he owned the 
tactical advantage at Gettysburg at the end of the fighting on July 2, and, 
therefore, when he held his commanders' meeting that evening.  However, Meade 
conducted that meeting in the same way he did the meetings of July 4 and July 
12.  The point being that he basically framed the questions for discussion, 
allowed the commanders to weigh in on their understanding of the situation and 
recommendations regarding what action to take next, then, in effect, held a 
referendum on the choices. 
 
	The argument has been made preveiously that Meade and the commanders already 
agreed going into the meeting of July 2 that the best thing for the AoP to do 
was to stay put and not fall back to the Pipe Creek Line.  While this is true, 
it does not address how Meade operated in these meetings. 
 
	Essentially Meade took himself out of the decision-making process by accepting 
a majority opinion in all three cases when meetings were held.  While it is true 
that he and the commanders were in agreement on July 2, the proper question to 
ask is "What would Meade had done if the commanders had voted to withdraw from 
their position at Gettysburg?"  The only evidence we have is how Meade acted in 
the July 4 and July 12 meetings, and both times he deferred to the judgment of 
the commanders.  On July 12 at Williamsport, he did not agree with the 
commander's decision not to attack Lee, but went along with the vote of the 
council anyway.  He also did essentially the same thing on July 4 regarding 
whether to counterattack Lee at Gettysburg. 
 
	My point is that the evidence shows that Meade deferred to his commanders in 
all three cases, and did not assert himself in any of these meetings.  The 
contrast with McClellan prior to the Peninsula Campaign was that the latter 
actually held meetings knowing beforehand what the outcome would be, because he 
knew he had the votes of his loyal commanders.  McClellan actually left the 
meetings after briefing the commanders on why he called them together, because 
he was confident of the outcome.  He used these meetings to salvage the dire 
political situation he found himself in regarding the Washington authorities, 
and allowed his commanders to give him political cover. 
 
	The proper way to conduct a council of war, it seems to me, is to listen to the 
commanders viewpoints then make the decision based on the army commander's best 
judgment, rather than manipulating war councils or deferring to them as 
McClellan and Meade did in these instances. 
 
Regards, Tom  >>

   I don't entirely disagree with your synopsis of the councils held by McClellan and Meade. If you hadn't used the word "deferred" as appllied to Meade's July 2 council, I would have read it and been in complete agreement. Perhaps it is just semantics. 
  To me, it implys Meade either had no position or he changed it after hearing his commander's thoughts. As I said earlier, I think July 2 was a case of Meade confirming a position he already held. I think he knew, in any case, that he could no more disengage with Lee than Lee could disengage with him.
  As far as the councils of July 4 and July 12, I'm  not comfortable enough with all the circumstances to have an opinion. On those dates I will happily defer to you :)
       


          Best Regards, Rich