GDG- war councils

[Tom Ryan]

<<Hello Tom,
     You posted (in part) :
  <<  It is interesting to compare McClellan and George Meade's use of war 
councils at Gettysburg.  McClellan  used them to maneuver around political 
issues that were not in his favor.  At Gettysburg and during the retreat, 
Meade called war councils to get opinions from his generals, and accepted 
their decisions in each case.  McClellan manipulated the councils, while 
Meade simply deferred to their judgment.  Neither method was ideal in my 
opinion. >>
 
Regards, Tom Ryan 
 
   I'm inclined to disagree with the characterization that at Gettysburg ( at least) Meade deferred to his generals judgement in staying and fighting it out. I think  that his generals oppinions conformed to his own conclusions and merely provided a concensus. I've never come across anything, especially how Sickles attempted to show Meades' reluctance, that persuaded me that Meade didn't appreciate the tactical position (albiet, tenuous at times) the AOP enjoyed at Gettysburg.
  
        Best Regards, Rich Brinton>>

Hi Rich,

	I agree totally with your point that Meade appreciated that he owned the tactical advantage at Gettysburg at the end of the fighting on July 2, and, therefore, when he held his commanders' meeting that evening.  However, Meade conducted that meeting in the same way he did the meetings of July 4 and July 12.  The point being that he basically framed the questions for discussion, allowed the commanders to weigh in on their understanding of the situation and recommendations regarding what action to take next, then, in effect, held a referendum on the choices.

	The argument has been made preveiously that Meade and the commanders already agreed going into the meeting of July 2 that the best thing for the AoP to do was to stay put and not fall back to the Pipe Creek Line.  While this is true, it does not address how Meade operated in these meetings.

	Essentially Meade took himself out of the decision-making process by accepting a majority opinion in all three cases when meetings were held.  While it is true that he and the commanders were in agreement on July 2, the proper question to ask is "What would Meade had done if the commanders had voted to withdraw from their position at Gettysburg?"  The only evidence we have is how Meade acted in the July 4 and July 12 meetings, and both times he deferred to the judgment of the commanders.  On July 12 at Williamsport, he did not agree with the commander's decision not to attack Lee, but went along with the vote of the council anyway.  He also did essentially the same thing on July 4 regarding whether to counterattack Lee at Gettysburg.

	My point is that the evidence shows that Meade deferred to his commanders in all three cases, and did not assert himself in any of these meetings.  The contrast with McClellan prior to the Peninsula Campaign was that the latter actually held meetings knowing beforehand what the outcome would be, because he knew he had the votes of his loyal commanders.  McClellan actually left the meetings after briefing the commanders on why he called them together, because he was confident of the outcome.  He used these meetings to salvage the dire political situation he found himself in regarding the Washington authorities, and allowed his commanders to give him political cover.

	The proper way to conduct a council of war, it seems to me, is to listen to the commanders viewpoints then make the decision based on the army commander's best judgment, rather than manipulating war councils or deferring to them as McClellan and Meade did in these instances.

Regards, Tom  

 
                   ----------------------------------------------------------------
You may unsubscribe by going to http://mailman.arthes.com/mailman/listinfo/gettysburg

You can add yourself to the GDG map at: http://www.frappr.com/gettysburgdiscussiongroup

View archived posts from May 2004 -  present at http://mailman.arthes.com/pipermail/gettysburg/