GDG- Re: Gettysburg Digest, Vol 27, Issue 10

[Richard M Kadas]

David,
  In any of stuart's correspondence is there an indication of his resaxtion to a costly victory which lost him the services of important staff members such as Heros von Borke and John Pelham?
  Dick

"David W. Gaddy" <dwgaddy at crosslink.net> wrote:
  Esteemed GDG Member Contributes:



>Subject: RE: GDG- Stuart and the historians II
>Message: 3 Tom Ryan)

In re Dennis's questions:


><>
>What effect did the three grand reviews have on the combat readiness of
>Stuart's troopers?
>
>Was Stuart overconfident about the ability of his troopers to handle the
>growing capabilities of the Federal cavalry?>>
>
>Dennis,
>
> Good questions. Oddly enough, I do not detect any major changes 
> in Stuart
>as a person or a cavalry leader after the battle at Brandy Station.
>Although he took heat from the Southern newspapers for being surprised and
>almost losing the battle, the person whose opinion counted the most to
>Stuart, General Lee, seemed almost totally unfazed by the whole affair.
>Lee, of course, was primarily concerned about results of performances, and,
>since the Union cavalry withdrew and Stuart held the ground after the
>battle, that apparently in Lee's mind was tantamount to victory. There was
>little if any sign of criticism of Stuart on the part of Lee. As a matter
>of fact, Lee started the invasion of the North the next day after the
>battle, June 10, as if nothing unusual had taken place.
>
> I think by this stage of the war, mid-1863, Stuart had formulated his
>mental approach to combat, and had adopted certain principles in commanding
>his cavalry units that did not change despite what could be considered a
>setback at Brandy Station. It is true, I believe, that Stuart became a
>little overwhelmed with his sudden elevation from command of a three brigade
>5,000-man force to five brigades with about 10,000 men. And he wanted to
>display this new found notoriety to the public with the grand reviews he
>staged. But even that was not unusual, because reviews were a standard part
>of his training and discipline of the troops. So it was not that much out
>of the ordinary. There is also no evidence that the reviews caused any
>degradation of the division. On the contrary, there is some evidence that
>it lifted the morale of his cavarymen to some degree.
_________________________________________________
Tom, Two thoughts: I wonder if the doubling of subordinates caused pause 
(apart from command and control
shake-out). I am thinking of Stuart's service a short time earlier as 
replacement for Powell Hill, who took over from Stonewall at 
Chancellorsville and was then wounded himself. My impression is that Stuart 
easily moved into "corps commander" responsibility during that brief but 
critical time, and I often wonder what the difference might have been had 
he been retained in that role. (Could it have been because Lee valued him 
more highly in the G2/cav cdr role and thought that Hill--on a good 
fighting day--was the best he could make available as a replacement for 
Jackson?)

Second, as to the reviews. In one of those moments I subject myself to 
every once in a while, I was re-reading the highly opinionated history of 
Jefferson Davis's nemesis, Edward A. Pollard, in re G'bg. Pollard 
characterized the cavalry reviews not in a negative way, but as intended 
principally to attract Federal attention and divert from the ANV move 
northward, characterizing the latter as being undertaken to draw Hooker and 
the AoP out of Virginia--which it did. Interesting. I found none of the 
criticism of Stuart I was looking for from the former editor of the 
Richmond Examiner.

Regards,
Dave Gaddy


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