GDG- Stuart and the Historians

Fri Aug 4 15:48:29 CDT 2006

Tim and John,

	Part of the dilemma that Stuart faced when push came to shove on June 25
was that he was trying to serve two masters (Lee and Longstreet), and he had
a perfect storm of conflicting orders.  Stuart was theoretically directly
subordinate to Longstreet, since his cavalry was traveling with and
screening for Longstreet's corps.  That is why Lee sent his a set of orders
dated June 22 through Longstreet.

	Longstreet attached a note dated 7 p.m July 22 to Lee's orders telling
Stuart, among other things, that it would be best for him to travel to meet
Ewell by taking a route by "passing around the rear of the enemy."  What is
also important, and often noted, is that Longstreet says these are the
instructions in Lee's orders.  Longstreet added that "[Lee] speaks of your
leaving, via Hopewell Gap...."  Since those specific instructions that
Longstreet says Lee gave to Stuart are, in fact, not what is contained in
the message from Lee contained in the OR, this leaves strong suspicion that
there must have been another set of orders from Lee that we do not know
about.

	Supporting this contention is the fact that when Lee sends Stuart a
"clarification" of his orders on June 23rd, he refers to two responses from
Stuart that morning at 9 and 10:30 a.m.  This may be supporting evidence
that Lee did send two sets of orders on June 22, one of which we do not have
other than the part quoted in Longstreet's note to Stuart.

	However, Lee's directions on the 23rd are confusing at best.  It us unclear
what Lee intended Stuart to do if Hooker remained inactive or if he did not.
Lee, perhaps realizing that the situation had gotten too complicated, added
"You wil, however, be able to judge whether you can pass around their army
without hinderance."  In other words, Lee told Stuart to make up his own
mind based on the situation he finds on the ground.

	By the way, perhaps Eric or J.D. can address whether they think there was a
third order from Lee to Stuart that we do not have, other than the two
orders in the OR dated June 22 and 23.

	So, in effect, Stuart was on his own when he ran into Hancock's corps, and
had to judge what was best at that point.

	John, you said that if Stuart had turned back on the 25th, Ewell could have
recalled Early.  There is no way that I can see that information about
Stuart's movements on the 25th can get to Ewell in time for him to act
accordingly.  Nor I cannot see the need for Ewell to do that anyway, since
there was no threat to his army in the area.

	Also, I think an argument could be made that the distance Stuart would have
to travel by going in reverse toward the mountains was longer than the route
he chose.  The difference, of course, is that he would have been with Lee's
other two corps, but he would not have fulfilled his mission to support
Ewell.  It is a real dilemma.

	Tim, if Longacre has the story correct in "The Cavalry at Gettysburg" then
Lee and Stuart discussed Stuart's upcoming activities as early as June 20,
but it sounds as if the subsequent written orders elaborated on these
discussions and that the mission had evolved so to speak.

	With regard to your surmise that Lee might have told Stuart that "You need
to get with Old Baldy as quickly as possible 'cause he's wondering out there
in front blind," keep in mind that Ewell had Jenkins and Imboden's cavalry
brigades with him as well as White's battalion and several companies of the
1st Maryland Cavalry.  That comes to about 4,000 cavalry available to Ewell.
Jenkins was in his front and Imboden on his left, and Early had at least a
regiment of cavalry with him I believe when he moved to York and
Wrightsville.  Of course, Ewell's right was basically unprotected, and that
is where Stuart was supposed to travel to as quickly as possible.

	I think the issue has to revolve around the actions of the Union army
moreso than what the Confederates did or did not do.  It was the continuting
observation Lee's movements by Gen. Tyler's outpost on Maryland Heights
together some pretty good work by Hooker's intelligence people the BMI that
gave Hooker the information he needed to make a timely decision which, in
the end, completing messed up Lee and Stuart's plan of action.  It was not
so much what the Rebels did wrong so much as what the Yankees did right.

Regards, Tom Ryan

-----Original Message-----
From: gettysburg-bounces at arthes.com
[mailto:gettysburg-bounces at arthes.com]On Behalf Of Tim Gennett
Sent: Friday, August 04, 2006 6:43 AM
To: GDG
Subject: Re: GDG- Stuart and the Historians

Esteemed GDG Member Contributes:

Something I have often wondered about, and the genesis of Stuart's ride to
connect with Ewell serves as an excellent basis for raising the issue: We
must rely now on the written record to discern what Stuart's was told to do.
We don't know what was said personally between Lee and Stuart when they
discussed this mission.  (My recollection is that they had met face to face
to discuss but, even if that did not happen in this instance, the thought
that it did happen allows me to illustrate the question.)  Stuart's
understanding of what he was supposed to accomplish and how he was suppose
to accomplish it was probably formed 95% by the face to face interaction
with Lee and 5% based on the written orders.  Looking at the written orders
is all that we can do now but we are only seeing part of the story.  Lee may
have said something to Stuart along the lines of, "Jeepers, Jed, you know
how inert those SOB Yankees are.  You need to get with Old Baldy as quickly
as possible 'cause he's wondering out there in front blind, so why dontcha
ride around those bluebellies like you've done before.  That would be the
quickest way to get to Ewell.  If you can pick up some supplies and stuff
along the way, so much the better."

When the orders are put down in writing the instructions are rendered more
formally but the orders are just that, a formality.  Stuart knew what he was
to do because Lee told him in person.

I'm not suggesting any dishonesty here on Lee's part.  In my office, what
transpires verbally in meetings and what the minutes of the meetings
actually say are always 2 different things.

Regards, Tim

----- Original Message -----
From: "John Baniszewski" <jdbano2001 at yahoo.com>
To: <gettysburg at arthes.com>
Sent: Thursday, August 03, 2006 20:25
Subject: GDG- Stuart and the Historians

> Esteemed GDG Member Contributes:
>
>
> The wisdom of Stuart's decision must consider the overall time line.
> Stuart got the "OK" to proceed on June 23, completed preparations on the
> 24th, and encountered Hancock's corp on the 25th, on which day he made the
> decision to go south.
>
> On the 23rd, Ewell was still west of the mountains, approaching
> Chambersburg.  On the 24th, he probably knew that the plan was for Stuart
> to meet him east of the mountains.  Ewell (Early's Division) began
> crossing South Mountain on the 25th.  Once he is east of the mountain,
> Early is at risk without a large cavalry force to screen and cover him, so
> a rapid hook-up with Stuart is important.
>
> Had Stuart turned back westward on the 25th, Ewell could have recalled
> Early on the 26th, and had him cross back to Chambersburg.
>
> Once Stuart turns south, it is a certainty that the amount of time needed
> to get to Pennsylvania will increase.  Each day that Stuart falls behind
> schedule, the risk to Early increases.
>
> There is a parallel with "Operation Market Garden" from WWII.  In that
> operation, success was dependent on a certain schedule.  The operation
> failed because the infantry pushing north fell behind schedule.  Any
> operation that is so heavily schedule-dependent is risky.  If a key
> element of the operation falls behind schedule at the very start of the
> operation, consideration should be given to cancelling the operation.
>
> John Baniszewski
>
>
> ---------------------------------
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