GDG- Stuart and the Historians

[Tim Gennett]

Something I have often wondered about, and the genesis of Stuart's ride to 
connect with Ewell serves as an excellent basis for raising the issue: We 
must rely now on the written record to discern what Stuart's was told to do. 
We don't know what was said personally between Lee and Stuart when they 
discussed this mission.  (My recollection is that they had met face to face 
to discuss but, even if that did not happen in this instance, the thought 
that it did happen allows me to illustrate the question.)  Stuart's 
understanding of what he was supposed to accomplish and how he was suppose 
to accomplish it was probably formed 95% by the face to face interaction 
with Lee and 5% based on the written orders.  Looking at the written orders 
is all that we can do now but we are only seeing part of the story.  Lee may 
have said something to Stuart along the lines of, "Jeepers, Jed, you know 
how inert those SOB Yankees are.  You need to get with Old Baldy as quickly 
as possible 'cause he's wondering out there in front blind, so why dontcha 
ride around those bluebellies like you've done before.  That would be the 
quickest way to get to Ewell.  If you can pick up some supplies and stuff 
along the way, so much the better."

When the orders are put down in writing the instructions are rendered more 
formally but the orders are just that, a formality.  Stuart knew what he was 
to do because Lee told him in person.

I'm not suggesting any dishonesty here on Lee's part.  In my office, what 
transpires verbally in meetings and what the minutes of the meetings 
actually say are always 2 different things.

Regards, Tim

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "John Baniszewski" <jdbano2001 at yahoo.com>
To: <gettysburg at arthes.com>
Sent: Thursday, August 03, 2006 20:25
Subject: GDG- Stuart and the Historians


> Esteemed GDG Member Contributes:
>
>
> The wisdom of Stuart's decision must consider the overall time line. 
> Stuart got the "OK" to proceed on June 23, completed preparations on the 
> 24th, and encountered Hancock's corp on the 25th, on which day he made the 
> decision to go south.
>
> On the 23rd, Ewell was still west of the mountains, approaching 
> Chambersburg.  On the 24th, he probably knew that the plan was for Stuart 
> to meet him east of the mountains.  Ewell (Early's Division) began 
> crossing South Mountain on the 25th.  Once he is east of the mountain, 
> Early is at risk without a large cavalry force to screen and cover him, so 
> a rapid hook-up with Stuart is important.
>
> Had Stuart turned back westward on the 25th, Ewell could have recalled 
> Early on the 26th, and had him cross back to Chambersburg.
>
> Once Stuart turns south, it is a certainty that the amount of time needed 
> to get to Pennsylvania will increase.  Each day that Stuart falls behind 
> schedule, the risk to Early increases.
>
> There is a parallel with "Operation Market Garden" from WWII.  In that 
> operation, success was dependent on a certain schedule.  The operation 
> failed because the infantry pushing north fell behind schedule.  Any 
> operation that is so heavily schedule-dependent is risky.  If a key 
> element of the operation falls behind schedule at the very start of the 
> operation, consideration should be given to cancelling the operation.
>
> John Baniszewski
>
>
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