GDG- Stuart and the Historians

John Baniszewski jdbano2001 at yahoo.com
Thu Aug 3 19:25:19 CDT 2006


The wisdom of Stuart's decision must consider the overall time line.  Stuart got the "OK" to proceed on June 23, completed preparations on the 24th, and encountered Hancock's corp on the 25th, on which day he made the decision to go south.

On the 23rd, Ewell was still west of the mountains, approaching Chambersburg.  On the 24th, he probably knew that the plan was for Stuart to meet him east of the mountains.  Ewell (Early's Division) began crossing South Mountain on the 25th.  Once he is east of the mountain, Early is at risk without a large cavalry force to screen and cover him, so a rapid hook-up with Stuart is important.

Had Stuart turned back westward on the 25th, Ewell could have recalled Early on the 26th, and had him cross back to Chambersburg.  

Once Stuart turns south, it is a certainty that the amount of time needed to get to Pennsylvania will increase.  Each day that Stuart falls behind schedule, the risk to Early increases.

There is a parallel with "Operation Market Garden" from WWII.  In that operation, success was dependent on a certain schedule.  The operation failed because the infantry pushing north fell behind schedule.  Any operation that is so heavily schedule-dependent is risky.  If a key element of the operation falls behind schedule at the very start of the operation, consideration should be given to cancelling the operation.

John Baniszewski 

 		
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