GDG- Re: Gettysburg Digest, Vol 27, Issue 1

[Tom Ryan]

Hi Dave,

	Thanks for the input.  Regarding the following:

<<This (from Chapter XII) is another one of Freeman's tantalizing statements
w/o citation as to source or basis. The number is remarkably close to that
he uses on p. 190 (Chap. X) as the total missing (5150)--which, in itself,
is part of an odd tally, assessing losses in terms of killed, wounded,
missing, but no statement on captured. I failed to find substantiation for
the statement in LL in Kent Masterson Brown.>>

	I also wondered how valid Freeman's stats were, and looked up the OR
citation he gave which was Lee's report to Davis on July 29.  In it Lee
said:

"The list of wounded and missing I know will be large...The latter will be
swelled by the stragglers, who commenced, on crossing the Potomac, to stray
from the line of march, and were intercepted by the enemy's cavalry and
armed citizens...Our people are so little liable to control that it is
difficult to get them to follow any course not in accordance with their
inclinations.  The day after the last battle at Gettysburg, on sending back
the train with the wounded, it was reported that about 5,000 well men
started back at night to overtake it.  I fear most of these were captured by
the enemy's cavalry and armed citiizens, who beset their route.  These added
to other stragglers, men captured in battle, and those of the wounded unfit
to be transported, will swell our list of missing...."

	Many of these stragglers that Lee says went along with the wagon train of
wounded ended up being gathered up by Gregg's cavalry that were operating in
the area of the Chambersburg Pike out which the train had moved on July 4.
My recollection is Gregg reported a couple thousand were captured.  The
combination of Lee and Gregg's reports seems to lend credence to Freeman's
statement.  Also I think there is evidence in reports that I have seen that
morale among at least a significant portion of the ANV troops was
understandably not high.  Poor morale, of course, has a dampening effect on
the army's fighting ability.

<<I also wonder about the Williamsport defenses, hastily but (to me)
impressively erected under the guidance of the ANV engineers. You have
doubtless studied the OR Atlas map, XLII (5), which reflects Meade's
appreciation. (Brown,  Map 12.4 on p. 317 fills those field fortifications
with deployed troops.) I wonder if you are not underestimating what Meade
was facing (or thought he was facing).>>

	Those maps you cite and the drawing of the fortifications on page 57 of the
special "Retreat from Gettysburg" issue of North & South Magazine (Aug. '99)
certainly demonstrate that an attack by Meade would be no picnic.  My
position that an attack was worth the effort and potential cost is based on
the disparity of numbers of troops, and the thin line of troops that Lee
could have placed in those trenches.  The sheer length of the position over
some 10 miles (not to mention that it swings back several miles on the north
to the Conococheague Creek --defended by cavalry) seems to me that was too
weak a position to hold out for very long despite the strength of the
entrenchments.

	The other part of my argument is that the heavy losses Meade would
undoubtedly suffer (a tradgedy in the making) would have been worth it over
the long run in ten times the number of lives that probably would have been
saved by a shortening of the war if he gained a victory.

	I understand how difficult it may be for some to accept this tradeoff, but
from all the evidence I have looked at it seems to me the attack would have
been successful.  At the same time, I also understand that this attack would
not have been made under the circumstances that existed at the time,
including the fact that Meade was not about to take that responsibility on
his shoulders given the opposition of his senior commanders.  I am talking
about what could have been, rather than what might have been.

As always best regards,

Tom